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A. Introduction 
In most of the situations where is more than one person involved one person 
is superior to the other. The father is superior to his child, the employer is 
superior to the employees, the captain is superior to his team or the general 
is superior to his soldiers. If there is a task to be carried out, any person may 
carry this task out on grounds of free will. But if the person does not want to 
carry out this task, then the superior may order him to do so. But what 
happens if the task carried out after such an order been given proves to be 
wrong? What if it even fulfils the definition of the crime? The ordered 
person may be accused of committing a crime and then may say: "But I was 
ordered to do so. Blame my superior but not me!" 
This dissertation will deal with the legal background of this "defence" raised 
by the accused. It will compare the three different legal systems of 
Germany, the United States of America and South Africa to determine on 
which grounds a superior order given prior to the act can serve as a basis for 
a defence. The three legal systems, the history, the acceptance by the courts 
and all the prerequisites established in the course of decades of 
jurisprudence will be analysed in order to establish a scheme under which 
these countries deal with superior orders being involved prior to a crime or 
offence committed by the receiving inferior. 
A.1 Superior order as a product of subordination 
"Order" is not a legal term. Except for a few codifications in the world 
which deal with military power of command it is unknown to the legal 
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language. Yet one comes across the order in so many situations and in so 
many disguises. All these situations and disguises have one thing in 
common, a power to enforce and concretise a certain human behaviour due 
to existing rules which leads to a relationship defined by subordination 
between the superior who is giving orders and the inferior or addressee who 
receives the order and carries it out. This shows the three necessary 
elements determining the legal environment of an order: a relationship of 
subordination 1, a person equipped with the power to enforce (power of 
command) and another person under the same relationship with the duty to 
obey. The order is the typical product of this subordination and in most 
situations means of communication in the relationship between superior and 
the receiver of the order. 
The relationships of subordination mentioned above can be divided into two 
different categories. The common subordination as it is encountered in the 
relationship between citizen and state authorities and the special 
subordination in all other cases where the three prerequisites2 apply. 
A.1.1 Common subordination 
Administrative law rules the common subordination and the citizens do not 
act on grounds of orders but on grounds of the rules set out in this field of 
law. If a citizen acts unlawful or a decision has to be made which is not part 
of the law but concretises it the state uses its catalogue of administrative acts 
to rule the inferior citizens.3 These type of ,,orders" very seldom play a role 
1 assumed that it is a lawful one 
2 as set out in chapter ,,the order as a product of subordination" 
3 e.g. notification, advice, directive, ruling et cetera 
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in criminal law and will therefore not be discussed in the course of this 
dissertation. 
A.1.2 Special subordination 
The real problems start with the order within the relationships of special 
subordination, because one has to leave the safe grounds of positive law and 
faces situations where grounds, extents and effects of the order as well as of 
the power of command are defined insufficiently. 4 
A person can enter into a relationship of special subordination on a free will 
as he or she becomes an employee5 and faces the superiority of his or her 
employer. In most of the countries some persons can be forced to enter in 
such a relationship, like the man joining military service or children who 
have to go to school. Both did not enter into this relationship on grounds of 
a free will but were forced to join army or school for the time being a soldier 
or a pupil. The third way to enter into a relationship of special subordination 
is a factual one. By entering a public library or a public bath the entering 
person is tacitly agreeing to the terms and conditions concerning the use of 
this institution. Though relevant for the group of special subordination this 
case hardly leads to an order with impact on criminal law. Thus the 
relationships in school, at work and in the military service are the ones 
where superior orders can lead to the involvement of criminal law. 
4 this varies from country to country as will be seen from the following chapters 
5 that includes state-employees and civil servants 
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A.2 Superior order in criminal law 
As long as the superior order is lawful and leads to lawful behaviour its role 
is not worth mentioning as far as criminal law is concerned. The same 
applies where an unlawful order leads to lawful behaviour. In this case civil 
rights may have been infringed but without any impact on criminal law. But 
in the moment in which an unlawful order that is binding for the addressee 
leads to an unlawful behaviour complying with the definition of a crime 
criminal law is challenged to judge the consequences the superior order may 
have for the culprit. Thus it has to be kept in mind that it is only the superior 
order, unlawful but binding, that may serve any purpose in the course of 
defending an accused. 
B. The Federal Republic of Germany 
Before the judicial history of the role of a superior order can be reported it 
has to be pointed out that there are major differences in the structure of 
liability between South Africa and Germany. 
B.1 Structures of Liability in German and SA practice 
South Africa determines the criminal liability of a person by having certain 
elements presented and proved in front of court beyond reasonable doubt. 
The first element is the act that fulfils the prerequisites of a proscription. 6 
Though the South African courts have not yet explicitly acknowledged the 
6 Snyman p60 et seq. 
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fulfilment of a proscription as a separate requirement, in this dissertation it 
will be regarded as forming part of the general requirements for criminal 
liability.7 In a second step the unlawfulness of the act has to be determined. 
Since 'unlawful' is only another legal term for 'unjustified' the absence of 
any justification establishes the unlawfulness of the act. The fmal element 
on the way to the culprit's criminal liability8 is culpability or mens rea. This 
requirement comprises of more than one subjective element, predominantly 
the culprit's criminal capacity, his intention9 and his awareness of the 
unlawfulness of his act at the time 10 of the commitment. 
Germany follows also a ,,three-step-test". The first step is called 
,,Tatbestand" and comprises of two prerequisites. The fulfilment of the first 
prerequisite is determined objectively and consists of the completion of a 
written proscription, since Germany obeys to nu/la poena sine lege, which 
means in the light of the constitution11 written law. This is backed up.by the 
second prerequisite called ,,subjektiver Tatbestand". It comprises first of all 
of general intention (,,Vorsatz") and depending on the specific proscription 
infringed of another specific intention called ,,Absicht". 12 This form of 
intention requires dolus directus, while the 'normal' intention only requires 
dolus eventualis. In a second step the unlawfulness is determined through 
establishment of absence of any justification, and its subjective pendant 
again backs up this objective criterion. The culprit must have acted in the 
7 see also Snyman p 144 
8 not necessarily conviction! 
9 colourless 
10 exception: actio libera in causa 
11 ,,Grundgesetz" from 1949 
12 e.g. theft in § 242 StGB (s242 Criminal Code of Germany) requires ,,Zueignungsabsicht", the 
intention to convert the stolen goods to the culprit's own use 
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knowledge of the specific13 ground of justification in order to get his act 
rendered lawful. In the last step the culpability (,,Schuld") has to be 
determined. Similar to South Africa it comprises of different elements. 
Criminal capacity and the ability to be aware of the unlawfulness 14 of the 
culprit's act are two major elements with intention not forming a part of it. 15 
In connection with culpability there are two basic grounds known in the 
German criminal law, which eliminate culpability: ,,Entschuldigungsgrund" 
and ,,SchuldausschlieBungsgrund". While the first one is usually connected 
to the circumstances under which the culprit acted, the second refers as 
,,personlicher SchuldausschlieBungsgrund" to reasons in the person of the 
culprit. The first one is of considerable implications for the role a superior 
order can play. It eliminates the blameworthiness and will be referred to in 
this dissertation by using the term 'excuse', since there is no more 
appropriate term in the English language. 
B.2 History 
Already in 1872 the German Military Penal Code provided that only the 
superior officer who had issued an unlawful order should be liable to 
punishment, but the discussion of the effects of superior order really heated 
up after the Second World War16, when the argument that the doctrine of 
13 in the case that he or she belived to act on grounds of a different defence than the one that 
applies . the consequences are dtermined according to the theory on mistake of justification 
(,,Rechtfertigungsirrtum") 
14 ,,Einsichtsfahigkeit" 
15 in connection with mistakes the Federal Penal Supreme Court (,,Bundesgerichtshof fur 
Strafsachen") recognises the reproach of having formed an intention (,,Vorsatzschuldvorwurf') as 
an element of culpability, which is of no consequence for this dissertation 
16 1939-1945 
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repondeat superior promotes lawlessness on a large scale was strengthened 
by the atrocities committed in the course of this war. Seeking defence at the 
Nuremberg Trials17 tried to invoke this doctrine in order to defend their 
crimes. During these trials Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel18 admitted that 
"the traditional training and concept of duty of the German 
officers which taught unquestioning obedience to superiors who 
bore responsibility, led to an attitude - regrettable in retrospect -
which caused them to shrink from rebelling against these orders 
and these methods even when they recognised their illegality and 
inwardly refuted them". 19 
After these trials and the various futile attempts to rely on superior order as 
a defence legal writers in Germany discussed for decades the question 
whether a superior order, unlawful but binding, delivers a defence on 
grounds of justification20 which renders the unlawful act of the culprit 
lawful or serves as an excuse.21 While a lawful superior order was 
recognised as a justification, the unlawful superior order was treated 
differently. According to the leading opinion during the 60s the unlawful 
superior order could only create unlawful behaviour of the inferior since his 
power to act only derived from the power of his or her superior. Therefore 
unlawfulness could not be rendered lawful simply by passing on a command 
to an inferior rank or position. As a consequence the courts and the legal 
writers faced the problem that in the light of the obligation to obey the 
17 "Nurnberger Prozesse" 
18 from 193 8 to 1945 Chiefof Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces 
19 as quoted in Eden, p642 with reference to the source of the quote 
20 ,,Rechtfertigungsgrund" 
21 Due to this split effect the term respondeat superior will be avoided in the course of this 
dissertation 
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inferior addressee of the order in principal had no choice to avoid his or her 
unlawful behaviour. 
They therefore reduced the obligation to obey and established the principle 
that in cases of an unlawful order the duty not to act unlawful has to be 
regarded as of the same value as the duty to obey the order.22 This principle 
was later codified in the laws regarding civil servants23 24 and the law for 
police forces regarding immediate compulsion. 25 As a result the act of the 
culprit stayed unlawful, but was not automatically excused. 
With regard to the culpability or blameworthiness the culprit is only 
excused, if he had no chance to recognise that carrying out the superior 
order will lead to a crime or to an offence26 . If the culprit could have 
recognised his act complying with a codified proscription or if he actually 
did recognise these circumstances he cannot be excused. 27 That includes 
also the case, if the culprit knew he would commit a crime but regarded the 
superior order he or she received at absolutely binding. 28 The only exception 
is made in connection with executive civil servants29 like police officers on 
active service. A culprit of this group had been regarded as acting with 
limited culpability due to the fact that the work of these people depends on 
quick decisions and fast taken action. 30 While this has been said for crimes, 
22 see D Oehler JuS 1963, p304 
23 civil servants = ,,Beamte" 
24 s56 Federal Civil Servants Act (§56 BBG = Bundesbeamtengesetz); s38 Civil Servants Outline 
Legislation Act (§38 BRRG=Beamtenrechtsrahmengesetz) 
25 s7(2) Immediate Compulsion Act (§7 II UZwG = Gesetz iiber den unmittelbaren Zwang) 
26 there is still a difference in Germany between crime and offence in the meaning of crime being 
a ,,Verbrechen" or ,,Vergehen" and offence being an ,,Ordnungswidrigkeit" or ,,Obertreteung" (old 
legal term) 
27 BGH NJW 1961, p374 (BGH = Federal Supreme Court; NJW = Neue Juristische 
W ochenschrift) 
28 see Oehler supra pointing out the missing of a matching excuse for this kind of mistake 
29 ,,Vollzugsbeamte" 
30 see again s7(2) Immediate Compulsion Act 
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regarding ,,Ordnungswidrigkeiten" and ,,Obertretungen"31 these people are 
fully excused. The reason for that is the principle of unreasonableness. The 
law does not want to force members of these groups of civil servants to 
make the decision whether to obey or to refuse. 32 
8.2 Today 
Germany faces today the same situation as m the 60s with the only 
difference that there are more than a million civil servants in relationships of 
special subordination and the military personnel meanwhile doubled. 
The first basic principle discussed above is still the same. It does .not.sound 
right that a superior can turn unlawful intention into a lawful act executed 
by the receiver of his or her superior order. Therefore if the superior is 
wrong he passes on his wrongfulness to the inferior who carries out the act 
itself. 33 On the other side an inferior cannot expect to be freed from any 
criminal liability, if he carries out an obviously criminal order and tries to 
use the ,,law-blindness"34 of his or her superior as an excuse/justification. 35 
In order to silence the ongoing discussions regarding the unlawful order the 
tendency from the 60s influenced the statutes and today's laws regarding 
civil servants and military expresses explicitly how to deal with unlawful 
superior orders: 
31 even less than the Anglo-American misdemeanor 
32 Oehler supra 
33 see LK-Hirsch, before s32, nl65 (LK = Leipziger Kormnentar); Ostendorf JZ 198l;p173 ·(JZ = 
Juristenzeitung); LK-Spendel, s32, n90 et seq; Sch-Sch-Lenckner, before s32, n87) 
34 ,,Rechtsblindheit" 
35 BGH NStZ 1986, p313 (NStZ = Neue Strafrechtszeitung): ,,Ein Befehlsempfanger, der einen 
von ihm als verbrecherisch durchschauten Befehl ausfiihrt, wird durch die Rechtsblindheit des 
befehlenden Vorgesetzten nicht von der eigenen strafrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit befreit." 
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B.2.1. Civil Servants - Obedience 
The above mentioned s56 BBG and s38 BRRG have been amended a few 
times and today declare an unlawful order not binding. The inferior civil 
servant has to execute his superior's order only ,,sofern nicht das ihm 
auf getragene V erhalten strafbar oder ordnungswidrig [ ... ] ist oder [ ... ] die 
Wiirde des Menschen verletzt".36 Corresponding provisions can be found in 
the legislation of the German federal states and the Immediate Compulsion 
Act37 . If it is not sure whether or not the superior order will lead to a crime 
the Federal Supreme Court38 stated, that there are 
,,doubts possible, whether the compulsory nature of the order 
even then ceases, if there is only a possibility that carrying out 
the order will lead to a crime committed by the inferior"39 . 
This problem is not even today solved, but the majority of the legal writers 
tends to deny the discontinuation of the order's binding character in case of 
an abstract danger to lead to a crime and accepts that the discontinuation in 
case of a specific danger.40 
36 if the behaviour ordered [by the superior J means committing a crime or an misdemeanor or 
violates human dignity, s56(2)(3) Federal Civil Servants Act, s38(2)(2) Civil Servants Outline 
Legislation Act 
37 UZwG (Gesetz fiber den unmittelbaren Zwang) 
38 BGHSt 19, p232 
39 
,,[ ... ] Zweifel moglich, ob die Verbindlichkeit des Befehls auch dann entfallt, wenn sich der 
Befehlsempfanger durch die Ausfiihrung der befohlenen Handlung mit mehr oder weniger grofier 
Wahrscheinlichkeit eines rechtswidrigen Vergehens schuldig machen wurde." 
40 of this opinion e.g. Sch-Sch-Lenckner, before s32, n90, Jakobs and Roxin, p657, n20; opposed: 
Jescheck 
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B.2.2 Military Service - Obedience 
For personnel in the military hierarchy s11(2)(1) Soldier Act41 states: ,,Ein 
Befehl darf nicht befolgt werden, wenn dadurch eine Straftat begangen 
wlirde".42 Since the refusal to obey an order is a crime Uflder the German 
Armed Forces Criminal Code43 even this code has to deal with superior 
order. After giving the definition of order44 as being ,,an instruction to act in 
a certain way, given by a military superior (s1(4) Soldier Act) to an inferior, 
given in writing, oral or otherwise and given in principal or for a particular 
case and with the demand of obedience" and establishing the refusal to obey 
as a crime, s22( 1) sets out the conditions Uflder which the refusal of 
obedience is not unlawful: 
,,[In the case of s20] the inferior does not act unlawful, if the 
order is not binding and especially if not given for an official 
purpose or is infringing human dignity or if by following the 
order a crime would be committed. The aforesaid is also valid, if 
the inferior beliefs erroneously the order has been binding". 45 
41 §11 II 1 SoldG (Soldatengesetz) 
42 An order must not be obeyed, if otherwise a crime would be committed. 
43 §20 WStG (Wehrstrafgesetz) 
44 §2 Nr.2 WStG: ,,eine Anweisung zu einem bestimmten Verhalten, die ein militarischer 
Vorgesetzter (§1 IV des Soldatengesetzes) einem Untergebenen schriftlich, miindlich oder in 
anderer Weise, allgemein oder fiir den Einzelfall und mit dem Anspruch auf gehorsam erteilt" 
45 §22 I WStG: ,,In den Fallen der §§ 19 bis 21 handelt der Untergebene nicht rechtswidrig, wenn 
der Befehl nicht verbindlich ist, insbesondere wenn er nicht zu dienstlichen Zwecken erteilt ist 
oder die Menschenwiirde verletzt oder wenn <lurch das Befolgen eine Straftat begangen wiirde. 
Dies gilt auch, wenn der Untergebene irrig annimmt, der Befehl sei verbindlich. 
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B.2.3 Justification or Excuse 
Though the solution for the question of obedience has been answered and 
thus the inferior's predicament in the case of an order to commit a crime has 
been defused, the question whether the superior order may serve as a 
justification or as a excuse is not yet answered a hundred percent. The 
answer to this question has in Germany under two aspects serious impact. 
B.2.3.1 Legal Aspects 
The first aspect is the criminal liability of accomplices46. The person in 
Germany acting in compliance with the proscriptions of conspiracy47, 
incitement48, aiding and abetting49 is only criminal liable, if the main 
perpetrator's crime was committed intentional and unlawful. Therefore the 
person rendering service in order to assist a person committing a crime on 
grounds of a superior order cannot be held criminal liable, if the superior 
order serves as a justification. In this case the acting inferior would have 
acted intentional but not unlawful and thus the prerequisites of the 
proscriptions for accomplices have not been met. 
The second aspect is everybody's right of self-defence. According to s32 of 
the German criminal code ,,self-defence is the defence that is necessary to 
46 in the popular meaning, see Snyman, p257 
47 Versuch der Beteiligung, §30 StGB 
48 Anstiftung, §26 StGB 
49 Beihilfe, §27 StGB 
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avert a present and unlawful attack from himself or a third person"50. Again, 
if the inferior acts on grounds of a superior order and this order renders his 
act lawful the person attacked has got no right to self-defence. 
B. 2. 3. 2 Legal Opinions 
Before this background the German courts, the legal writers and the organs 
of legislation in Germany are struggling to fmd a viable solution. Due to the 
consequences pointed out with regard to the criminal liability of 
accomplices and the right to self-defence the leading opinion among the 
German writers is that a superior order should serve only as an 
excuse.51This opinion is predominantly based on the consideration that an 
unlawful order cannot convert wrong into law and that a superior·cannot get 
something done lawfully through an inferior what he can only do by himself 
unlawfully. 52 
The opponents of this oplllion see m the supenor order solely a 
justification. 53 Their argument is that granting the superior order the status 
of an excuse will lead to an intolerable situation. It seems unfair to put a 
civil servant or a soldier under the obligation to execute an order, but 
simultaneously declaring his action, which is in accordance with his or her 
duty, as unlawful and fmally to expose him or her to the effects of self-
defence. 
50 §32 II: ,,Notwehr ist die Verteidigung, die erforderlich ist, um einen gegenwartigen 
rechtswidrigen Angriff von sich oder einem anderen abzuwenden." 
51 see Amelung JuS 1986, p337; Kiiper JuS 1987, p92; LK-Spendel, s32, n90 + 100 et seq. 
52 Roxin, p655, nl 7 
53 Sch-Sch-Lenckner, before s32, n88a with regard to the legal writers Jakobs, Jescheck, 
Schmidhauser, Stratenwert 
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B.2.3.3 Present Situation (status quo) 
Looking at the present situation a distinction is made between the superior 
order that is binding and the superior order that is not binding. 
B.2.3.3.1 Superior Order - not binding 
If the superior order is not binding and the inferior executes this order by 
committing a crime or a misdemeanor the inferior is criminal liable to the 
extent he ought to have foreseen the unlawfulness of his conduct. But if he 
believed that the order of his superior was binding he acted with reduced 
culpability or in some cases even without culpability. 54 This is the result of 
the culpability's element of blameworthiness and is reflected in various 
passages of the codified law55, especially s5(1) of the Armed Forces 
Criminal Code56. This section reads as follows: 
s 5 Acting under Order 
(I) If - because an order was given - an inferior commits an 
unlawful act that complies with the prerequisites of a criminal 
code, he or she acts only with culpability, if he or she knows 
that the act is unlawful or - due to the circumstances - the 
unlawfulness is obvious. 57 
54 Wessels, p 119 with further references given 
55 see s56(2)(3) Federal Civil Servants Act and s38(2)(2) Civil Servants Outline Legislation Act 
56 §5 II WStG 
57 ,,Begeht ein Untergebener eine rechtswidrige Tat, die den tatbestand eines Strafgesetzes, auf 
Befehl, so trifft ihn eine Schuld nur, wenn er erkennt, dafi es sich um eine rechtswidrige Tat 
handelt oder dies nach den ihm bekannten Umstanden ersichtlich offensichtlich ist." 
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Though this section does not mention that it only deals with an order that is 
not binding it can be drawn from the context that it is limited to this field. 
Beside these codifications there are no more sections dealing with the non-
binding order. Therefore and due to the fact that the cited laws only apply to 
civil servants and soldiers58 one tends to assume that a superior order that is 
not binding may only serve as an excuse for soldiers and civil servants. But 
since this would be a violation of s3 59 of the German Constitution60 the 
courts started to apply s5 Armed Forces Criminal Code by drawing an 
analogy to other cases involving people not being soldiers or civil servants. 
B.2.3.3.2 Superior Order - binding 
With regard to the binding superior order the leading opinion followed by 
the courts is to treat the order as a justification. This situation is treated as a 
collision of duties61which is usually subsumed under s34 German Criminal 
Code62, though in the case of superior order the duty to obey (duty to act) 
collides with the duty not to act unlawful ( duty to omit) while s34 applies 
only to the collision of duties to act. 63 
58 e.g. sl(l) Armed Forces Criminal Code: ,,This act only applies to crimes commited by soldiers 
of the [German] federal armed forces(= Bundeswehr)" 
59 principle of equality before the law 
60 Grundgesetz 
61 ,,Pflichtenkollision" 
62 §34 StGB Rechtfertigender Notstand (justifying necessity): ,,Wer in einer gegenwartigen, nicht 
anders abwendbaren Gefahr fiir Leben, Leib, Freiheit, Ehre, Eigentum oder ein anderes Rechtsgut 
eine Tat begeht, um die Gefahr von sich oder einem anderen abzuwenden, handelt nicht 
rechtswidrig, wenn bei Abwagung der widerstreitenden Interessen, namentlich der betroffenen 
Rechtsgiiter und des Grades der Ihnen drohenden Gefahren, das geschiitzte Interesse das 
beeintrachtigte wesentlich uberwiegt. Dies gilt jedoch nur, soweit die Tat ein angemessenes Mittel 
ist, die Gefahr abzuwenden." 
63 see remarks from Roxin, p656, nl8, fn22 
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In this collision conflict the public interest in the obedience of the soldier or 
the civil servant is today rated higher than the interest in the avoidance of a 
lawful act when it comes to minor offences. But in the case of serious 
offences like crimes or the violation of human dignity the public interest in 
the avoidance of unlawful behaviour enjoys priority. The arguments64 
brought up in favour of a solution relying on the superior order as an excuse 
are not longer regarded valid, because first of all the approach that a 
justification will turn ,,wrong" into ,,right" is not justified. The superior's 
behaviour stays unlawful though it is carried out by means of a lawful tool 
meaning the lawful acting inferior. With regard to self-defence this right is 
admittedly discontinued65, but the consequences are not as fatal as displayed 
by the opponents of the justification-theory. If the inferior is committing a 
crime during carrying out a superior order the order is not binding and 
therefore the rules discussed above in connection with a not binding superior 
order apply. Thus the victim keeps the right to self-defence. Beside this the 
victim has in any event the right to sue the superior who will usually be only 
a representative of the state, if he or she suffers damages and last but not 
least even the victim has got the right to defend with the provision of s35 
Criminal Code at his side rendering his unlawful defence lawful66 provided 
he or she judged the situation right. 
64 see chapter B.2.3.2 
65 for a catalogue of solutions see LK-Spendel, s32, n75 et seq. 
66 on grounds of justifying neceessity 
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B.3 Recent German Cases on Superior Order 
B.3.1 Introduction 
After the breakdown of the eastern block countries and the fall of the 
German wall, the German courts had to deal with a huge amount of cases of 
the former GDR67. Beside the former heads of state and ministers who had 
to stand68 and are still standing69 trial the "border-soldiers" or 
"borderpolice"70 who served at the wall and had the order to shoot 
everybody who attempts to flee the territory of the GDR are the accused in 
ongoing trials. Though the issue whether or not a crime committed under the 
regime of the former GDR is punishable in the courts of the Federal 
Republic of Germany71 is a major aspect in these trials, the superior order 
plays a very important role. In this context the Federal Supreme Court of 
Germany72 had to evaluate 'intentional homicides committed by border-
soldiers of the GDR at the Berlin wall'. 
B.3.2 Facts of the case 
1984 W and H were deployed as border-soldiers at the Berlin wall. They 
were patrolling the wall in order to look out for GDR-citizens who attempt 
to leave the territory of the GDR. The order given for the case that the 
soldiers catch somebody in the act of escaping read: 
67 
· German Democratic Republic 
68 e.g. Erich Honecker 
69 e.g. Egon Krenz and Gunther Schabowski standing trial while this dissertation is written 
70 "Grenzpolizei" 
71 problems of applying act of statedoctrine under public international law 
72 BGHNJW 1993, pl41 et seq. 
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"Under all circumstances and by all means it must be 
prevented that a person trying to escape reaches enemy 
territory73 . Border-breakthroughs are under no 
circumstances permissible. Persons violating the border 
have to be apprehended or eliminated. "74 
On the 1st of December 1984 S, 20 years old, was caught in the act of 
climbing the wall between the suburbs Pankow (East) and Wedding (West). 
While standing on a ladder and reaching for the coping of the wall, W and H 
opened fire and shot more than 50 bullets at S. They knew that they could 
kill him but accepted this risk in order to execute the given order to the 
letter. Due to the fact that the seriously injured S was only admitted to 
hospital two hours after the shooting75, he died fifty minutes after arriving at 
this hospital. 
B.3.3 Findings of the Court 
The court first had to establish the applicability _of s5 Armed Forces 
Criminal Code. The law of the GDR contained also a provision regarding 
superior order76 and because of s2 of the German Criminal Code only the 
more 'lenient' law could be applied. Since the GDR law lays down that even 
a subordinate who did not recognise that he or she was violating a criminal 
law proscription by executing the given order is fully criminal liable, s5 of 
73 meant by this was West-Berlin, the free part of divided Berlin 
74 see NJW 1993, p141 bottom 
75 due to problems in connection with observance of secrecy and competence 
76 s258(1) Criminal Code of the GDR (§258 I DDR-StGB) 
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· the Armed Forces Criminal Code of (Western) Germany was the more 
lenient law77 and had to be applied. Beside this the court ruled that the scope 
of s5(1) - though limited to soldiers of the Federal Armed Forces of 
(Western) Germany - is no obstacle for applying the provision and it could 
be applied as an analogy due to the fact that otherwise no law would be 
applicable which would be "unfair"78 .79 
Applying s5(1) H and W could only be blamed (culpability!), if the 
circumstances made it obvious that their act complied with a proscription of 
the criminal code. The court explained that the violation of the proscription 
to kill somebody was only obvious to the accused, if his or her act was a 
violation beyond any doubt. 80 The right to live is a result of human dignity 
and recognised throughout the community of nations. Therefore it must have 
been obvious that the state had no right to order the "execution" of any 
human being trying to climb the wall in order to move to the west. 81 The 
BGH confirmed this argument with the number of shots fired at S and stated 
that this was "a terrible act that removed any reasonable ground of 
justification"82 and that the majority of the East-German population 
disapproved of the use of weapons at the border. 
The court of appeal found W and H guilty and had no reason to doubt 
confinning full criminal liability, though it found out of other reasons a 
mitigation of the sentence appropriate. 
77 compare with the dicussion of s5 ( 1) above 
78 11unbillig11 
79 BGH NJW 1993, p149 
80 BGH supra with regard to leading commentaries for the Armed Forces Criminal Code (WStG) 
81 argument of the judex a quo at the Landgericht Berlin ( court delivering verdict now heard on 
appeal to BGH) 
82 11 
[ ••• ] ein deratig schreckliches und jeder verniinftigen Rechtfertigung entzogenes Tun [ ... ] 11 
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C. The United States of America 
Since a valid defence or excuse on grounds of a superior order given by a 
superior to his or her subordinate requires a conflict-situation, every system 
providing the defence or excuse on grounds of superior order needs a 
recognised prohibition of disobedience. In the United States of America 
(USA) this prohibition is laid down in artt. 90(2), 91(2) and 92 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice from 1950. Beside this the treatment and 
function of superior orders preceding a crime or offence in the USA have a 
long history. 
C.1 History 
One of the most important judgements dealing with the supenor order 
serving as a defence was delivered already nearly 200 years ago in United 
States v Bright in 180983, where the Circuit Court held, that 
"[ ... ] the order of a superior officer to take the life of a citizen, or 
to invade the sanctity of his house and to deprive him of his 
property, would not shield the inferior against a charge of murder 
or trespass [ ... ]"84 
and which subsequently led to a verdict against Bright. This absolute point 
of view was moderated in 1866, when in Riggs v State the court limited the 
exclusion of superior order as a defence to "manifestly illegal orders" the 
court defined as "in its substance being clearly illegal, so that a man of 
83 Circuit Court, Pennsylvania, Case No.14,647, 24 Federal Cases, p1232 et seq. 
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ordinary sense and understanding would know as soon as he heard the order 
read or given that such order was illegal"85 . From this judgement and from 
subsequent American cases dealing with the classification of superior order 
it became clear that such order under the limitations expressed in Riggs v 
State serves as a ground of justification rendering the unlawful act 
committed by the inferior lawful. 86 
In 1941 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court87 was first to analyse 
carefully a soldier's situation contravening the law while executing an 
unlawful o:r;der of his superior. In this case private Neu of the US Army was 
ordered to drive a truck in seventh position of a convoy, to "follow through 
regardless" in order to keep up with the convoy and if the head of the 
convoy went through red lights [robot] he had "to go through, too". The 
commanding officer B then added that any driver who got lost would be 
tried by court martial. During the driving in the convoy the convoy went 
through red lights and private Neu was injured due to an accident occurring 
at these lights. The court held:88 
" [ 5] But since the jury could fmd on the evidence that the illegal 
order was given, it becomes necessary to inquire as to its effect 
(if given) upon the plaintif/9. The plaintiff was not in the 
position of an agent or employee who has received an illegal 
order from his principal or employer. He was a soldier. Even in 
time of peace obedience to orders is the first duty of a soldier. 
He is not expected to argue points of law with his superior 
84 ibid supra at p1237 end 
85 Inbau, p692 
86 Eden, p645 bottom 
87 in Neu v McCarthy, p570 et seq. 
88 ibid supra, p573 
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officers. Failure of instant obedience leads to military 
punishment, which may be severe. Recognition of the peculiar 
necessity of discipline in the military service and of the position 
in which the subordinate may find himself through no fault of his 
own in the event that commands of his superiors clash with the 
civil authority has led courts in well considered cases to regard 
obedience to a military order as a justification for conduct which 
would otherwise give rise to civil or criminal liability, unless the 
order is so palpably unlawful that a reasonable man in the 
position of the person obeying it would perceive its unlawful 
quality." 
Fallowing the atrocities in the war between the USA and Vietnam trials 
during the 70s had again to focus on the implications of superior order. In 
United States v Calley9° the court continued the more subjective approach 
started in Massachusetts in 1941 and employed this approach in order to 
determine the consequences of an unlawful order given by the superior: 
"The acts of a subordinate done in compliance with an unlawful 
order given to him by his superior are excused and impose no 
criminal liability upon him unless the superior's order is one 
which a man of ordinary sense and understanding would, under 
the circumstances, know to be unlawful, or if the order m 
question is actually known to the accused to be unlawful. "91 
89 private Neu 
90 22 US CMA 534 (1973) 
91 as quoted by Inbau, p687 
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With this verdict the ground of justification mutated into an excuse, which is 
under American law not the same like a justification as indicated e.g. in 
§1.12(3)(c) Model Penal Code.92 Beside this the scope of this excuse 
(former justification) had also been limited, since after these judgements not 
only positive knowledge of the unlawfulness made the defence of superior 
order impossible, but also any situation or circumstances under which "a 
reasonable man" or "a man of ordinary sense and understanding" would 
know the act to be unlawful. Subsequent judgements followed this idea. 93 
C.2 Today 
The legal situation today is still determined and dominated by the 
judgements, since the law has not yet been codified in all states. Beside this 
the Model Penal Code, drafted 1962 is not yet in force, but already serves as 
means of interpretation various purposes on various fields. 
Before and after the draft of the Model Penal Code the position of the courts 
upholding their subjective approach by granting only limited access to the 
excuse on grounds of superior order became more and more object of 
criticism. The legal writers and the American Law Institute94 admitted that 
the quality of discipline is properly more rigorous in military organisations 
than in civilian ones, and so provided a special defence based on adherence 
to military orders. But on the other hand they did not want to honour the 
special circumstances a soldier is in like it was pointed out in Neu v 
McCarthy by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts by giving these 
92 American Law institute, Model Penal Code, p 186 
93 e.g. Calley v Calloway as reported in LaFave, p44 l 
94 Model Penal Code, p389 
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subordinates blanket immunity comparable to the Rhode Island law (1968) 
under which "the actor is not liable, civilly or criminally, for any acts done 
while under orders of a superior officer"95 . While some states granted 
blanket immunity96, some limit the immunity to lawful orders97 or even 
grant civil immunity only98, most of the states99 only refer to acts done in the 
performance, the discharge, or the line of duty, thus leaving unclear the 
status of mistaken obedience to unlawful orders. 
In order to compromise between the extreme positions of blanket immunity 
and no excuse at all in the official draft of the Model Penal Code the 
Institute implemented100 in s2.10: 
Section 2.10. Military Orders 
It is an affirmative defence that the actor, in engaging in the 
conduct charged to constitute an offence, does no more than 
execute an order of his superior in the armed services that he 
does not know to be unlawful. 
Since this codification found its place under Art. 2 and therefore among the 
principles of liability without further clarification it is difficult to build a 
parallel to the first discussed German law by saying if the defence is an 
excuse or a justification. Liability in the narrow sense would mean excuse, 
while in the wider sense it again can be both. But since the consequences are 
not serious like under the German law an assignment is anyway not 
95 Rhode Island General Laws Ann. §30(7)(3) 
96 e.g. Missouri, Montana (repealed 1966), Utah and West Virgina 
97 e.g. Colorado, Minnesota, Kentucky and Florida 
98 e.g. Oklahoma 
99 e.g. California, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, New Jersey, Nevada, New York, North 
Dacota, Oregon, and South Carolina 
100 considered and approved at the May 1962 meeting 
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necessary. Whatever defen.ce it is, it is important to recognise the increment 
of cases in which superior orders serves as a defence. By deleting the 
hypothetical element based on a reasonable or ordinary person, the Institute 
took the difficulties into account having a civilian jury to examine the 
legality of military orders and the likelihood that a soldier of ordinary sense 
and understanding would know a given order to be illegal. The Institute 
therefore preferred to insulate members of the armed services from liability 
in civil courts except on those occasions when they knew the order to which 
they responded to be unlawful. 101 
D. The Republic of South Africa 
Since South Africa similar to the United States of America (USA) does not 
rely so much on the opinion of its legal writers as does Germany, the 
opinions and fmdings of the courts provide the source for dealing with the 
consequences of superior orders leading to a crime. Beside this the codified 
law of South Africa deals only in the Military Discipline Code102 with the 
obedience or disobedience of commands and orders, when it states that 
,,[ a ]ny person who in wilful defiance of authority disobeys any lawful 
command given personally [ ... ], shall be guilty of an offence and liable on 
conviction [ ... ]"103 . But with this duty of obedience the problem how to 
judge an unlawful superior order is not solved but caused. Various 
authorities had already to deal with this conflict. 
101 Model Penal Code, p392 , 
102 First schedule of the Defence Act, No.44 of 1957, based on sl04(1) Defence Act 
103 s19 ,,Disobeying Lawful Commands or Orders" 
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D.1 The Opinion of the Courts 
Since the last tum of the centuty the South African courts have been 
frequently occupied with the question under which circumstances a superior 
order might mitigate or neutralise the subordinate's criminal liability. 
D.1.1 History 
Following these judgement through the past three requirements have been 
developed by the courts in South Africa: 
a) subordinate's duty of obedience 
b) superior's lawful authority over subordinate104 
c) act inflicted no more harm than necessary105 
The question whether or not exists an absolute duty of obedience in the 
person of the receiver of a superior order was first discussed by Solomon JP 
in R v Smith. 106The learned judge did not dispute that the basic rule is 
obedience, but set out that there are exceptions to this duty that is so vital 
for the functioning of every military organisation. Since the limits of the 
duty to obey highly endanger this function, Solomon JP referred for the 
104 see the German ,,commander" in Rex v Werner and Another 1947 (2) SA 828 (A) at 834 
105 see Rex v Mayers 1958 (3) SA 793 (SR) 
106 (1900) 17 SC 561 
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limits to the Manual of Military Law107regarding the rule there as ,,a 
reasonable and proper rule to apply"108: 
,,This states that if the commands are obviously illegal, an 
inferior would be justified in questioning or even refusing to 
execute such commands [ ... ] [otherwise] must they [soldiers] 
meet with complete and unhesitant obedience."109 
That leads in reverse to the result that every order that is not obviously 
illegal will serve as a defence on the side of the inferior, who committed a 
crime in executing this order. Since it is still too difficult to rule on this 
proposition, he went further mitigating this somehow absolute proposition: 
,,[ ... ] if a soldier honestly believes he is doing his duty in obeying 
the commands of his superior, and if the orders are not so 
manifestly illegal that he must or ought to have known that they 
were unlawful, the private soldier would be protected by the 
orders of his superior officer." 110 
This approach had been referred to in quite a few later cases, though it had 
not always been applied111 and in 1944 De Beer AJP was the first one to 
question Solomon's approach. The learned judge criticised the emphasis on 
the inferior's perception of the lawfulness and referred then as well to the 
Manual of Military law as did Solomon JP, but arrived at a different rule 
107 ch3, slO 
108 (1900) 17 SC 561 at 566 
109 ibid supra 
110 ibid supra 
111 see e.g. Rexv Werner and Another 1947 (2) SA 828 (AD) at 833; Rexv Kumalo and Others 
1952 (1) SA 381 (AD) at 387; S v Shephard 1967 (4) SA 170 (W) at 177; 
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that obedience is only owed to lawful orders and with regard to classify an 
order as lawful stated: 
,,[ ... ] by far the sounder rule is the former one, which describes a 
lawful command as one not contrary to the ordinary civil law and 
justified by military law. "112 
After this some judges like Ludorf Jin R v Ar/ow and Another113 followed 
the strict approach of De Beer AJP by stating that ,,[h ]y is alleen verplig om 
wettige bevele te gehoorsaam" or still refer to Regina v Smith like Levy Jin 
S v Andreas P en 'n Ander114 . In reverse it is also clear that any subordinate 
is not allowed to follow an order from which he knows that it is unlawful. 
Regarding soldiers this can be gathered from all judgements quoted and had 
been extended by Colman J to employees and junior co-employees in their 
relation to their employer and senior co-employee respectively115, though an 
extension - at least for the cases of defence - to servants or employees can 
be doubted. 116 
D.1.2 Today 
The leading case in this context is still today the case of S v Banda117 . In this 
case the court had to decide a case, in which in 1988 a number of soldiers in 
112 Rexv Van Vuuren 1944 OPD 35 at 38 with reference to ch3, slO Manual of military law 
113 1960 (2) SA 449 (T) at 452 
114 1989 (1) PH H38 (SWA), also reported as S v Mule en 'n Ander 1990 (1) SACR 517 (SWA) 
115 see S v Shepard 1967 (4) SA 170 (W) at 178 
116 Burchell and Milton, pl54; but see different opinion from De Wet & Swanepoel, p99: ,,Wat 
ons reg betrefbestaan daar [ ... ] in beginsel ook geen verskil tussen amptelike onderhoriges en 
antler onderhoriges nie." 
117 1990 (3) SA 466 (B) 
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the Bophuthatswana Defence Force (BDF) and members of the 
Bophuthatswana National Security Unit118 (BNSU) attempted a coup d'etat 
of the Bophuthatswana government. For the main part they attacked and 
captured the president in order to force him to resign from his post, Cabinet 
Ministers were attacked, their families captured and the Ministers coerced 
into signing resignation papers. The culprits took command of Molopo 
Military Base, detained certain Ministers and military personnel of the State 
there and occupied the Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Centre. The President, 
Ministers and others were kept hostage inside the National Independance 
Stadium. Brought before court the accused stated that 
"at all material times they participated in and executed the acts 
referred to in their statements in their capacity as soldiers in the 
BDF, and as a member of the BNSU, and acted in obedience to 
orders, and or instructions given to them by a person in authority 
over them." 119 
Friedman J dealing with the superior order as a defence raised by the 
accused responded in his introductory sentence that 
"[i]t is generally accepted that an act performed by a subordinate, 
emanating from the instruction of his superior, may, albeit within 
certain limits, be justified by the defence of obedience to 
orders." 120 
118 in total 143 people 
119 1990 (3) SA 466 (B) at p472 
120 ibid supra at p479 
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After extensively discussing the previous mentioned judgements from 
Regina v Smith until S v Mule en 'n Ander the learned judge summed his 
discussion up and stated comprehensively: 121 
,,A soldier must obey orders issued by a lawful authority, and is 
under a duty to obey all lawful orders, and, in doing so, must do 
no more harm than is necessary to execute the order. Where, 
however, orders are manifestly beyond the scope of the authority 
of the officer issuing them, and are so manifestly and palpably 
('klaarblyklik') illegal that a reasonable man in the circumstances 
of the soldier would know them to be manifestly and palpably 
illegal, he is justified in refusing to obey such orders: The 
defence of obedience to orders of a superior officer will not 
protect a soldier for acts committed pursuant to such manifestly 
and palpably illegal orders." 
D.2 Legal writers 
South African legal writers have accompanied the var10us judgements 
throughout the years and commented on them either favourably or critical. 
In their discussion of the verdicts quoted above the question whether the 
defence under the limitations set out by the courts will be a justification or 
an excuse concerning mens rea has always been a dominant one, which 
some courts have ,,uit die oog verloor"122. 
121 ibid supra at p496 
122 De Wet & Swanepoel, plOO 
- 34 -
If one follows the approach as in Regina v Smith one of the main aspects 
was the belief of the inferior the order being lawful. This indicates more a 
lack of mens rea in respect of the unlawfulness 123 and therefore superior 
order being rather an excuse than justification, though Watermeyer CJ in 
agreeing with Solomon JP124 pointed already out that that mistake was a 
mistake of law. Since ,,it is a recognised principal in our criminal law that 
ignorance of law does not excuse [ ... ] such a belief did not relieve them of 
criminal responsibility". 125 The principle of ignorantia iuris neminem 
excusat behind the learned judge's expression has been abandoned by the 
Appellate Division in 1977. 126 Thus there is no need for the constructed 
consequence by Burchell and Hunt highlighted Solomon JP' s idea that even 
unlawful orders could protect the inferior in cases where they are not 
manifestly illegal and come to the conclusion, that this fact ,,points to 
justification rather than absence of mens rea as the ground for exemption 
from liability". 127 
Beside the criticism by De Wet en Swanepoe/128, their (Burchell & Hunt) 
result goes hand in hand with the analysis Snyman129 presents under the 
chapter 'Unlawfulness'. In this context Snyman follows clearly the 
difference and the argumentation that had been found in Germany. He 
distinguishes between lawful and unlawful orders and states that in the case 
of an lawful order the act is justified on the ground that the subordinate is 
acting in an official capacity, or because he is merely a part or an extension 
123 Burchell and Hunt, p357 
124 Rex v Werner 1947 (2) SA 828 (AD) at.833 
125 supra at 835 
126 see S v De Blom 1977 (3) SA 513 (A) 
127 Burchell and Hunt supra 
12s plOl 
129 Chapter IV, p88 et seq. 
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of the body or authority which acts in an official capacity. 130 With regard to 
an unlawful order Snyman accepted Solomon JP's rule in principle. 131 If the 
inferior knew that the order was unlawful he, he cannot raise any defence. If 
he - wrongly - believed the order was lawful, he may raise the defence of 
mistake or error, and thus leaving him with no intention. The same aspect is 
given credit by De Wet en Swanepoel: 
,,[A]s die bevel 'n opvallend wederregtelike is, kan die dader 
horn miskien nog beroep op afwesigheid van skuld, omdat hy 
onder die dwaling verkeer het dat hy wel verplig is om te 
gehoorsam. Hierdie verweer berus dan me op 'n 
regverdigingsgrond nie, maar op afwesigheid van skuld, in casu 
afwesigheid van dolus." 132 
Other legal writers133 also follow the objective test and are therefore still 
criticised by the courts e.g. as per Friedman J as being ,,inflexible, rigid and 
exacting" 134. 
Still, the distinction between justification and excuse is not draWf! 
sufficiently and it is held that the distinction between manifest and non-
manifest illegality is untenable since there are no degrees of unlawfulness. 135 
The idea to link the manifest illegality to the catalogue of 'grave breaches' 
under the Geneva Convention of 1949136 or to any other catalogue has not 
been followed yet and would probably only lead to a complication of 
130 Snyman, pl23 
131 ibid at pl24 
132 De Wet & Swanepoel, pp 100, 101 
133 e.g. Joubert 
134 S v Banda at 484 
135 Eden, pp650, 651 
136 Eden, p653 
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superior orders and would not contribute to any solution to the conflict the 
soldier ( or other subordinate) may be in. 
With further regard to the distinction between excuse and justification 
Burchell and Milton137 quote Friedman } 38 with the 'fact' that the law 
recognises obedience to superior orders as a case of compulsion and thus is 
prepared to treat unlawful conducts in exercise of such order as an 
excuse. 139 And Jordaan ,,on closer scrutiny" finds Solomon JP also 
,,considering mens rea rather than whether the actus was reus"140 . Beside 
this Jordaan, herself regards the main issue of superior orders in 
determining the duty of obedience as exculpatory or justificatory. While a 
justification renders the act lawful and thus brings it in accordance with the 
legal order, an excuse excludes mens rea and though the act does still not lie 
within the true interest of the law the personal culpability of the culprit is 
addressed141 leading to his acquittal. An order contradicting the law cannot 
lie within the true interest of the law. This therefore does not lead to 
justification but to excuse as the appropriate defence 142, or with the words of 
De Wet en Swanepoel: 
,,[W]aar die bevel self wederregtelik 1s, daar geen 
gehoorsaamheidsplig kan bestaan nie, en die handeling dus nooit 
geregverdig kan wees deur so 'n plig tot gehoorsamheid nie."143 
137 at pl53 
138 S v Banda 1990 (3) SA 466 (B) at-479 
139 Friedman J also considered mens rea at pp485E, 4951, 496A 
140 1991 (4) SACJ 230 at 232 
141 ibid supra p233 
142 ibid pp233, 234 
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E. RESUME 
Today courts, codes and writers of all three analysed countries recognise the 
dilemma of soldiers, policemen or - in the case of Germany - civil servants, 
who are confronted with the fact that they committed a crime, offenc~, 
misdemeanour or ,,Ordnungswidrigkeit" in execution of an order and are at 
least regarding one aspect all of the same opinion that was expressed by the 
Circuit Court in United States v Decker: 
,,Loyalty to a superior does not provide a license for crime."144 
As long as the order is lawful, which means that a superior with appropriate 
authority acted within the legal boundaries of his capacity, all countries 
acknowledge the subordinate's duty to obey and since this duty is not 
negotiable any unlawful act occurring during the execution of the superior 
order as rendered lawful by means of defence of superior order. 
E.1 Scopes of defence 
The analysed countries and their laws show major differences only when it 
comes to unlawful orders. In this context the subordinate is facing the 
dilemma that he or she has on the one hand to obey to the order and on the 
other hand not to act unlawful. This dilemma is getting worse if the 
unlawfulness is minor and can sometimes be solved by the military codes 
and statutes if the unlawfulness of the order is so evidently, palpably, 
143 pl 01, but excluding justification due to necessity, which has to be answered to.the rules of 
necessity under South African law 
144 304 F.2d 702 (6th Cir.) 
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,,klaarblyklik" unlawful, that the duty of obedience has ceased to exist and 
this must be recognised by the inferior. But in the grey area of orders that 
are not at first sight ,,manifestly" illegal the law systems are trying 
desperately to create justice and they face their own dilemma: do they want 
soldiers questioning every order, because they are fully criminal liable if 
carrying out an unlawful order? Or do they want perfect discipline for which 
they have to grant an escape from criminal liability, be it exculpatory or 
justificatory, if an unlawful order is obeyed and executed without 
questioning? 
At this stage the background of the answers becomes a political one, which 
is reflected through the different history in all three countries discussed: 
E.1.1 Germany 
Since the beginning of this century Germany has been a country in which 
military order was a dominant element. Blind obedience made it possible to 
start two wars in which the strength of the German soldiers was their 
discipline and obedience. In the times of the Third Reich this blind 
obedience without questioning any superior authority due to threatening 
severe punishments led into a catastrophe which nearly eliminated the 
country from the maps. After this war with its cruel system, its atrocities and 
other inhumane appearances Germany was seeking to prevent any form of 
repetition and tried to correct the mistakes that had been made. One of these 
mistakes was the blind obedience asked from each soldier. The reflections of 
this change in the German law are obvious. The law as of today requires that 
the inferior at the time receiving his order judges its lawfulness. If he or she 
comes to the result that the order is unlawful, not given for an official 
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purpose or is infringing human dignity he or she is not bound to his general 
duty of obedience and he is allowed to refuse in terms of s22(1) Armed 
Forces Military Code. If he or she on the other hand regards the order as 
binding without realising the contrary s5(1) of the same law can grant an 
excuse making it still possible to hold accomplices criminal liable. In the 
very unlikely event that a binding order leads to an unlawful act, the soldier 
is protected since s34 of the German Criminal Code renders it lawful. But 
even under this provision the soldier first has to evaluate the situation before 
he comes to the conclusion that he would rather follow the order than omit 
the unlawful act. 
Putting these facts together the German law favours the rational subordinate 
who not only obeys blindly but before he or she starts to act judges the order 
and the act expected from him or her before the order is carried out. 
E.1.2 United States of America 
The United States of America play more and more the role of the 
international police force when it comes to conflicts throughout the world. 
Mostly furnished with a mandate of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations145 one can find American soldiers in nearly every armed conflict. In 
order to keep the huge number of soldiers under control and since the whole 
world is watching their action obedience and discipline are top priorities. In 
this context the words of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court may be 
145 e.g. in Somalia, Kuweit and former Yugoslavia 
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recalled for they seem still best to describe even today's situation of the 
American soldiers: 146 
,,Even in time of peace obedience to orders is the first duty of a 
soldier. He is not expected to argue points of law with his 
superior officers." 
In legal consequence of this the Model Penal Code had been drafted and 
s2.10 omitted the hypothetical element based on a reasonable or ordinary 
person. The result is a soldier who is not in need to first judge his or her 
superior's order because he or she faces charges only, if he or she positively 
knows that the given order is unlawful. On the other side refuse the courts to 
adopt the view of the American Institute who drafted the Model Penal Code 
already 1962. Though authority from recent years is scarce the courts seem 
still to favour an additional hypothetical approach in order to limit the 
applicability of this specific excuse. 
E.1.3 South Africa 
South Africa's history is also - until recently - characterised by military 
involvement and armed conflicts. 147 But prima facie the courts seem to 
ignore this status of South Africa as they also - like the US courts - apply a 
hypothetical test using ,,the reasonable man in the circumstances of a 
soldier"148. But what first looks like a similarity is on second sight the 
opposite. While the USA employ the reasonable man-test to limit the scope 
146 Neu v McCarthy, p573 
147 e.g. the Angolan war 
148 Friedman Jin S v Banda, p496 
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of the excuse based on superior order, South Africa employs this test to 
reduce the area of compulsory obedience. If it comes to the defence after 
committing an unlawful act in execution of a superior order the subordinate 
is always excused, except for the case of a ,,manifestly and palpably illegal 
order"149 . Phrasing the scope of the excuse in this way brings South Africa 
right between the opinion of the US Courts and the discussed s2.10 of the 
Model Penal Code. It is more than the sole knowledge but less than what a 
reasonable man would judge to be unlawful. 
E.2 Justification or excuse 
Regrettably only Germany draws in connection with supenor order 
acceptable lines between the defences of justification and excuse. But on the 
other hand this is no surprise, since this difference is crucial to the criminal 
liability of accomplices and the right to self-defence as discussed earlier on. 
With regard to the other two countries the demarcation line has not yet been 
determined in a satisfying way. There seems no doubt that an unlawful act 
under a lawful order should be rendered lawful since an agent or instrument, 
due to their power that is only deriving from the principal, cannot tum 
legality into illegality. Especially with the duty of obedience framing the 
final act, the stigma of unlawfulness clinging to the inferior's act is highly 
unsatisfying. But with the same matter of course the unlawfulness of an act 
based on an unlawful order cannot be rendered lawful due to military 
discipline or obedience. The act has to be regarded as finally unlawful. The 
only problem to solve is the criminal liability of the subordinate in conflict. 
149 ibid 
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Since justification is not the only way to escape liability also all aspects of 
culpability have to be carefully scrutinised. The conflict between obedience 
and avoidance of unlawful acts is already solved, since the soldier is under 
no obligation to obey an unlawful order. But under the pressure of each 
specific command and under the circumstances of every single case it can 
happen that he or she does not realise the unlawfulness or did realise but 
still felt bound to obey. These situations are clearly better comparable with 
cases of lacking do/us or missing awareness of unlawfulness than any other 
cases. But both cases concern mens rea and not the unlawfulness of the 
actus. 
Beside this writers of criminal law have long written about 'unlawful' also 
meaning 'contrary to the bani mores of the community'. If the execution of 
an unlawful order leads to an act infringing the bani mores, how can then 
the unlawful order itself serve to render the act lawful? The majority of the 
legal writers is already voting for the solution based on the defence of 
excuse and it can only be short before the courts follow. 
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